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A. Deductibility of Lease Payments Allocated to Reserve Account
In Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States1 the Fourth Circuit addressed
the issue of whether "reserve" payments as part of monthly rentals are
deductible .under section 162(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code)2
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Section 162(a) of the Code
allows tax deductions for all ordinary and necdssary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year for carrying on a trade or business." If a
payment meets the criteria of section 162(a), the taxpayer may deduct
the amount of the payment from the business' gross income under section
62(1) of the Code.4 If, however, the payment is not allowed as a deduction
under section 162(a), the payment is deductible, if at all,5 as a capital
expenditure6 under section 263 of the Code.1 A capital expenditure,
unlike an ordinary and necessary expense, cannot be deducted totally in
the year of payment; rather, a capital expenditure must be amortized
from year to year.8 Courts have consistently had difficulty determining
whether a particular expense is an ordinary and necessary expense or a
capital expenditure.9 The courts have therefore resorted to applying the
statutory language of section 162(a), inquiring whether the expense is
"ordinary," in order to distinguish between ordinary and necessary
expenses and capital expenses. 10
Among the items which are deductible as ordinary and necessary
1 597 F.2d 395 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).
I.R.C. § 162(a).
Id.; see Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971).
Section 62(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code) allows the deduction of
expenses attributable to a trade or business conducted by the taxpayer from the gross in-
come of the taxpayer as defined in § 61. I.R.C. § 62(1).
5 Section 162 of the Code, which grants deductibility for ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses, and § 263 of the Code, which denies deductibility for specified capital ex-
penditures, are neither mutually exclusive nor all inclusive. Therefore, payments not de-
ductible under one section are not necessarily deductible under the other. See General
Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832
(1964); Consumers Water Co. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 939, 945 (D. Me. 1974).
8 A capital expenditure is a payment made to acquire property which has a useful life
substantially beyond the taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1960).
1 Section 263 expenditures are considered capital because they produce benefits beyond
the taxable year. See I.R.C. § 263.
s Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
'The Supreme Court has indicated that the difficulty in determining whether a pay-
ment is currently deductible lies in the often minute distinctions between those payments
that are classified as ordinary and necessary expenditures and those classified as capital
expenditures. See Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. at 353; 383 U.S. at
689.
10 383 U.S. at 689-90. An expenditure is "necessary" within the meaning-of § 162(a) if it
is "appropriate and helpful [to] the development of the taxpayer's business." Id. at 689
(quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933)). Thus, it is not difficult to demon-
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expenses under section 162(a) are rentals or other payments required as a
condition to continued use or possession of property.1 Although section
162(a)(3) provides for the deduction of rent, that section has not been
construed to require the allowance of a deduction for all payments
characterized as "rent" by the involved parties. 1 2 A payment which a
taxpayer seeks to deduct as rent must fulfill both the specific criteria of
section 162(a)(3) relating to rent' and the general criteria of section
162(a) relating to the requirements of an ordinary and necessary
expense. 4
Courts have used various tests to determine whether an expense is
ordinary and necessary. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan
Association"5 the Supreme Court established the "separate assets" test
for deterrhining whether an expenditure is ordinary and necessary or
capital.' 6 The Court held that a payment which creates or enhances a
separate and distinct asset for the taxpayer is necessarily capital in
nature, and cannot be deducted under section 162(a) of the Code.'7 In
Lincoln Savings, the Court found that a separate and distinct asset had
been created by the taxpayer's payments because the taxpayer obtained a
property interest in the fund into which the payments were made.' s The
Court also indicated that the potential for future benefit is not controlling
strate that an expenditure is necessary. The determination that a payment is "ordinary" has
therefore become the crucial factor in concluding that the payment may be deductible under
§ 162(a). "Ordinary," defined as "normal, usual, or customary," requires that a determina-
tion of the ordinariness of a payment must relate to the particular facts and context from
which the expense arises. 403 U.S. at 353 (quoting Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493,
495-96 (1940)).
" Section 162(a)(3) of the Code specifically provides for the deduction of rental
payments:
[R]entals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued
use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the
taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(3). See also Trias. Reg. § 1.162-1 (1960).
" The characterization of certain payments as "rent" by the parties contracting for a
lease is not dispositive of the deductibility of those payments under § 162(a)(3). See, e.g.,
Foyt v. United States, 561 F.2d 599, 602-03 (5th Cir. 1977) (monthly "rental payments"
under sublease were actually contributions to capital, not rent, because taxpayers' interest
in real estate was determined by amount of capital contributions which included credit for
all such "rental payments" made by taxpayer); M & W Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d
841, 844, 846 (7th Cir. 1971) ("rental payments," which were very high for area, and fact
that fair market value of leased land was at least twice taxpayer's option price indicated
that payments were applied in reduction of purchase price, and were not "rent"); West Vir-
ginia N.R.R. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 63, 65 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929
(1961) ("rent" paid to satisfy personal stock debt not considered "rent").
's See text accompanying note 11 supra.
14 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
" 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
,e Id. at 354.
17 Id.
8 Id. at 355. The Lincoln Savings Court noted that the FSLIC fund into which the
payments were made was a fund of last resort, to be used only if all other funds were ex-
hausted, thus indicating a further separate and distinct character of the payments. Id.
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on the deductibility of a payment.19 The extent of the possible future
benefit of a payment is, however, important to the determination of
deductibility."0 Courts have used tests other than the separate assets test
to standardize deductibility of payments with future benefits. One
alternative test, the one-year rule," addresses the deductibility of
payments with future benefits by requiring that an expenditure is a
capital expenditure if it has a useful life of greater than one year, or if the
expenditure secures benefits to the taxpayer which have a life of greater
than one year.22 Under the one-year rule, a capital expenditure is
characterized by the intention of the taxpayer in making the payment to
produce a favorable business benefit with effects beyond the taxable
year.23 The one-year rule is based upon the principle that section 162(a)
allows for deductions of payments which realize and exhaust attendant
benefits in a single tax year."4 Such a policy reflects the general policy of
the Code, that the taxation system should match income and expenses of
the tax year in order to tax only net income.' 5
In Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States,2 the Fourth Circuit utilized
the one-year and separate assets tests to determine whether a lessee's
"rent" payments in accordance with the terms of a lease were deductible
under section 162(a)(3).27 The Fourth Circuit held certain payments
characterized as "rent" under the lease were not rentals within the
meaning of section 162(a)(3), and therefore reversed the district court's
allowance of taxpayer's deduction.28 The Fourth Circuit stated that
although the one-year and separate assets tests can be distinguished, the
one-year test is incorporated into the separate assets test.29 The court
reasoned that a separate and distinct asset, by definition, will serve the
taxpayer beyond the year in which the payment was made.30 The court
1" Id. at 354.
10 See note 6 supra.
2' The one-year rule was announced by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Akin, 248
F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957); see text accompanying notes 22-25 infra.
" 248 F.2d at 744. See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907
(4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 382 U.S. 68 (1965) (expenses incurred in pre-operative
employee training capital in nature because benefits extended beyond year in which
incurred).
" See Darlington-Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 229,
231 (D.S.C. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968) (payments intended to produce more
favorable contract relationships capital in nature because such payments obtained intangi-
ble business advantage which would extend beyond current accounting year).
24 Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 284 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 945 (1974). See Darlington-Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 273 F.
Supp. 229 (D.S.C. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968); Richmond Television Corp. v.
United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 382 U.S. 68 (1965).
2 345 F.2d at 907.
26 597 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1979).
27 Id. at 399-406.
28 Id. at 406.
29 Id. at 405.
30 Id.
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cautioned, however, that the one-year element of the separate assets test
is not dispositive; rather, the one-year rule is an indicator that a
particular expenditure may be capital in nature. Such an indication
functions only as a threshold determination of deductibility, subject to
the further determination of whether the expenditure creates a separate
asset.31
In Jack's Cookie Co., the taxpayer, Jack's, agreed to lease a county-
owned industrial building for thirty years.3 2 Funding for the construction
of the building was obtained from the proceeds of two municipal bond
issues.33 To ensure repayment of the principal and interest, the lease
required "monthly rentals" consisting of several components.3 The first
component was one-sixth of the interest due on each bond issue for the
six months following each payment. Second, taxpayer was required to pay
one-twelfth of the next principal payment due on each bond issue. The
third component consisted of administrative expenses incurred by the
Trustee and Paying Agent, a Memphis bank. In addition to these three
components designed to repay the bonds, the lease further required
Jack's to pay "reserve payments" in equal monthly installments for the
first fifteen years of the lease.3" At the end of the fifteen years the total of
the reserve payments was to equal $285,000.6 Unlike the other three
components, the reserve payments 'were not to be used to service the
bonds routinely. 37 The reserve payments were to be used according to
Jack's limited discretion, and were not controlled by the repayment
requirements of the bond issue.38 The most important option under
31 Id. The Fourth Circuit explicitly stated in Jack's that the one-year rule is still viable,
even though the intervening decision in First Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. United States, 558 F.2d
721 (4th Cir. 1977), did not refer to the one-year rule or to Richmond Television or Darling-
ton-Hartsville. See notes 21-23 supra. The Jack's court stated that First Nat'l Bank incor-
porated the one-year rule into the separate assets test of Lincoln Savings. 597 F.2d at 404.
32 597 F.2d at 396.
3 The two bond issues were authorized by the County Court of Giles County, Tennes-
see in accordance with two Tennessee building bond acts. One issue was established pursu-
ant to The Industrial Building Revenue Bond Act of 1951, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1701 to
1716 (1971), which provided for the issuance of construction financing bonds and the rent-
ing of the industrial buildings constructed with the proceeds from the bonds. The statute
further authorized the municipalities to charge rent sufficient to retire the bonds. The sec-
ond issue was established pursuant to The Industrial Building Bond Act of 1955, TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 6-2901 to 2916 (1971), which provided for a reserve fund composed of rent
payments on industrial buildings constructed under the bond issue.
The principal amount of each bond issue was $1,250,000. Each bond issue was to ma-
ture serially over the term of the 30 year lease. Repayment of both bond issues was secured
by an indenture of mortgage and deed of trust between Giles County and the trustee bank.
597 F.2d at 396-97.
31 597 F.2d at 397.
35 Id.; see TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1701 to 1716; 6-2901; note 33 supra.
36 597 F.2d at 397.
" The reserve payments were not to be used for the routine service of the bonds. Ac-
cording to the lease, however, if Jack's defaulted on its rent so that no funds were available
to service the bonds, the reserve payments would be so utilized. Id. at 397 n.5.
" Under the lease, Jack's could direct the trustee to invest the reserve fund in United
States obligations, returning all interest earned from that investment to the fund. Further,
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Jack's discretion was the election to credit the amount of the reserve fund
to the rent obligations remaining at the end of the first fifteen years on
the prepayment of those remaining obligations.3 9 Although the control of
the reserve fund was largely at Jack's discretion, the payments into that
fund were nonetheless required by the lease.40 Under the lease, if Jack's
failed to pay the "monthly rentals," the sum of the four components set
out in the lease,4 1 the county could cancel the lease.
42
Jack's claimed a deduction under section 162(a)(3) for the monthly
rental payments3 made during the taxable year.44 The IRS disallowed
only the amount of the reserve payments component from Jack's total
rental payment deduction and assessed a deficiency for that partial
disallowance.4 5 Jack's paid the deficiency and filed a petition for refund. 46
Following the denial of the petition for refund,'47 Jack's fied suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
to recover the amount of the tax deficiency paid.48 The district court
granted summary judgment for the taxpayer for the full amount of the
deficiency and interest,49 reasoning that the mandatory nature of the
reserve payments qualified the payments as "rentals" within the meaning
of section 162(a)(3).5 0 The Government appealed the district court's
the lease entitled Jack's to credit, equal to the amount of the fund, toward prepayment of
rental obligations, either at the end of fifteen years or in case of condemnation or damage of
the building. Id. at 397.
" Id. The Fourth Circuit's opinion does not state whether the parties contemplated
that the amount of the reserve fund at the end of fifteen years, $285,000 plus any interest
earned from investments, would equal the amount of the remaining rental obligations. If
such an equation was contemplated, the issue of trade or business expenses versus capital
expenses clearly would be decided under the settled law relating to advance payments of
rent.
40 Id.
41 See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
42 597 F.2d at 397.
43 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
44 597 F.2d at 398.
41 Jack's paid monthly rental payments totalling $191,720.92 in the taxable year in con-
troversy. The IRS disallowed $20,479.08 of that amount. The disallowed portion equaled the
amount of the reserve payments made during'that year.-Id.
48 A petition for refund for overpayment is made to the Commissioner or the District
Director of the IRS. The petition must be made within the prescribed period of time. The
claim for refund must set forth the detailed grounds upon which the refund is claimed and
include a statement of the relevant facts. The petition must be made and verified under
penalties of perjury. The filing of a claim for refund is a prerequisite to suit upon disallow-
ance by the Commissioner. 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATON §§ 58.03,
58.17 (1976).
"' 597 F.2d at 396.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 399 (citing Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States, No. C-C-75-358 (W.D.N.C. June
3, 1977)). The lease's condition requiring payments for possession of the premises convinced
the district court of the propriety of deducting the reserve payments under § 162(a)(3). The
district court also noted with approval Jack's good faith compliance with the terms of the
bond issue lease. Although unclear, the district court apparently referred to § 162(a)(3) only.
6891980]
690 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
decision to the Fourth Circuit.51
The Fourth Circuit analyzed the reserve payment deductibility issue
under the established "usual and ordinary sense" definition of "rentals"
contained in section 162(a)(3).12 The court stated that, although
compulsion or requirement of payment is an essential characteristic of
"rentals" within the meaning of section 162(a)(3),53 compulsion alone is
not sufficient to qualify a payment as a "rental." 4 Indeed, the Fourth
Circuit determined that an obligation to pay addresses only the issue of
whether a payment is of the type contemplated by section 162(a)(3).15
According to the Jack's court, the scope of inquiry beyond that
determination of compulsion has two levels.5" The first level of inquiry
addresses the "nature of the cost,"57 whether the payments were ordinary
and necessary expenses, capital expenses, or something else.58 In order for
a taxpayer to argue successfully for deductibility under 162(a)(3), the
taxpayer must show that the payment was ordinary and necessary in
nature, and not capital. Once a payment has been categorized, a court
must consider the second level of the inquiry relating to deductibility. On
the second level, the inquiry addresses the statutory guidelines relating to
whether, when, and in what amounts disbursements of the same kind as
those in controversy may be considered in the calculation of taxable
income.59 The ultimate question addressed by this two part inquiry is
whether the cost in dispute can be deducted in full in the year in which it
was incurred. 0
Applying the two part test to the facts in Jack's, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the only necessary inquiry was the "nature of the cost"
categorization of the reserve payments as a trade or business expense or a
capital expense.6 1 To determine whether the payments were trade or
The court addressed the requirement of payment issue of § 162(a)(3), but did not address
the requirements of § 162(a). See text accompanying notes 3 & 11 supra.
51 597 F.2d at 396.
51 The Fourth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's definition of "rentals" stated in
Duffy v. Central R.R., 268 U.S. 55 (1925). 597 F.2d at 399. Rent under Duffy is a fixed sum
or equivalent property paid at set intervals for the use of property. 268 U.S. at 63.
53 Section 162(a)(3) (requirement of payment as element of rent). I.R.C. § 162(a)(3).
51 See note 12 supra.
55 597 F.2d at 400.
56 Id. at 401.
67 Id.
58 In determining the "nature of the cost" incurred, the Fourth Circuit in Jack's al-
luded to the importance of statutory provisions regarding different types of costs. Section
162 relates to trade or business expenses, and § 263 relates to capital expenses. I.R.C. §§
162, 263. The court also alluded to the fact that these statutory provisions are neither mutu-
ally exclusive nor all inclusive. 597 F.2d at 401; see note 5 supra.
11 597 F.2d 401; see note 58 supra.
10 If a payment is an ordinary and necessary expense under § 162(a), it can be deducted
in the current year. I.R.C. §§ 162 (a), 62(1); see note 4 supra.
I" Categorization of the reserve payment as a trade or business expense or a capital
expense was the only necessary inquiry in Jack's because both parties conceded the treat-
ment of the possible categorizations. If the reserve payments were trade or business ex-
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business expenses or capital expenses, the Fourth Circuit first applied the
one-year rule. 62 By the terms of the lease, the reserve payments produced
benefits beyond the taxable year in the forms of investment returns and
rent credit after fifteen years.e After applying the one-year rule, the
Jack's court considered whether the reserve payments created a separate
and distinct asset for Jack's.6 ' The Fourth Circuit determined that Jack's
had a property interest in the reserve fund, and thus, the fund was an
asset with an ascertainable and real value.6 5 The court held that Jack's
disbursements to the reserve fund were not ordinary and necessary
business expenses, and thus, were not deductible for the current year.6 6
The Fourth Circuit's holding that Jack's reserve payments were not
ordinary and necessary business expenses was correct. The one-year test
67
and the separate assets test s are appropriate to the determination of
deductibility of business expenses. These tests isolate the critical issue,
whether the payment can be deducted in full in the year in which it was
incurred.69 The Jack's court correctly analyzed the reserve payments
under those tests. The benefits of the reserve payments clearly accrued to
Jack's beyond the tax year, most dramatically in the fifteenth year, when
the fund could be applied to remaining rent obligations."0 Further, the
reserve fund was a separate and distinct asset produced by the reserve
payments.
7 1
The formula which the Fourth Circuit devised in Jack's facilitates the
policy of the Code by matching income and expenses of the tax year to
tax only net income. The court established a step-by-step analysis to
determine whether a payment is an ordinary and necessary business
expense under section 162(a) or a capital expense under section 263 of the
Code. The Fourth Circuit in Jack's, by providing a formula rather than a
strictly technical rule relating only to rental payments, created a rule
which applies generally to questions of deductibility of business expenses.
MARGARET HUTCHINS CAMPBELL
penses, then they would be deductible under § 162(a)(3); if they were capital, or something
else, they would not be deductible under § 162(a)(3). See text accompanying notes 3, 5-7
supra.
82 See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
85 See note 38 supra.
See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
65 537 F.2d at 406.
68 Id.
' See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
88 See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
8, See text accompanying note 60 supra.
70 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
'1 See text accompanying note 65 supra.
1980]
692 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
B. Good Faith Purpose for Issuing Summons
Congress has consistently granted the Secretary of the Treasury au-
thority to investigate a taxpayer's1 financial status regarding that tax-
payer's taxation liabilities.2 Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code)s vests the Secretary with the further authority to issue summonses
for the purpose of examining books, records, and testimony relevant to a
particular, present investigation.4 A section 7602 summons is issued by an
examiner authorized by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue after a
taxpayer under investigation has refused to comply voluntarily with an
IRS agent's request for specific relevant materials.5 The purview of a sec-
tion 7602 summons was originally perceived as limited to investigations of
civil liabilities6 and the purposes enumerated in the statute.7 An IRS in-
I Section 7701(a)(14) of the Internal Revenue Code defines "taxpayer" as "any person
subject to any internal revenue tax." "Person" is defined broadly in § 7701(a)(1) to "mean
and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation."
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1), (14). The regulations draw the definition of "person" more broadly, in-
cluding a wider range of organizations and individual capacities. Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)
(1977).
a Section 7601 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a broad duty on the Secretary of
the Treasury to cause Treasury officers and employees to investigate and audit the returns
of "persons," see note 1 supra, in each internal revenue district. I.R.C. § 7601. This statu-
tory mandate is of such broad scope that the Supreme Court held that the traditional prob-
able cause prerequisite for searches is not required for IRS investigatory practices, reasoning
that inquiry, not accusation, is the focus of § 7601. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141,
146 (1975). The authority granted to the Secretary by § 7601 is further derived from the
general duty required of the Secretary by § 7801 of the Internal Revenue Code, which re-
quires the Secretary to administer the provisions of the Code. I.R.C. § 7801(a).
Section 7601 evolved from early taxation provisions, and in 1894 was reenacted without
change. The substance of the provisions of § 7601 remained intact through several tax acts,
and was also contained in the 1939 Code. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 34, § 3600, 53 Stat. 435
(now I.R.C. § 7601).
3 I.R.C. § 7602.
4 Courts have consistently held that the power to issue summonses under § 7602 of the
Internal Revenue Code should be construed liberally because the investigatory process
serves a vital public purpose with regard to the efficient function of the IRS. See, e.g., De
Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 87 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 936 (1963) (procedural
statute § 7605 of the Code should not be read so broadly as to limit the latitude of the grant
in § 7602).
1 See generally [1979] I INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDrr, part IV (CCH) §§ 4021,
4022.11, 4022.3.
6 Section 7602, on its face, addresses only civil purpose. I.R.C. § 7602; see note 7 infra;
G. CROWLEY & R. MANNING, CRImINAL TAX FRAUD-REPPESEN ING THE TAXPAYER BF'oRE
TRIAL 225 (1976). Further, the Supreme Court has generally indicated that the scope of §
7602 summonses is limited to discovery information relating to a civil investigation. See
Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964) (taxpayer may challenge summons on ground
that it was used to discover evidence for criminal case); cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217, 226 (1960) (use of administrative summons to discover evidence for criminal case "must
meet stern resistance by the courts"). Section 7608(b) of the Code, which confers authority
on a "criminal" investigator of the Intelligence Division to execute and serve search and
arrest warrants and to serve subpoenas and summonses, supports the conclusion that § 7602
was intended to address only civil investigations. See I.R.C. § 7608(b); Lipton, Investigative
Authority; The Commissioner's Summons; Search Warrants; Contempt; Constitutional
Rights and Other Defenses in TAX FRAUDs 63, 65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lipton].
I Section 7602 sets out five purposes for which a summons may be legitimately issued
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vestigation is dual in nature, however, because the Internal Revenue Code
sets out civil and criminal penalties for tax fraud." The scope of section
7602 summonses has expanded, therefore, to include investigations relat-
ing to criminal liabilities.9 This expansion has created a confusing body of
law.
10
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this confusion in United
States v. LaSalle National Bank." In LaSalle, the Court held that the
proper standard for determining whether a section 7602 summons should
be enforced is whether the summons was issued in good faith 2 prior to an
under that section:
1) ascertaining the correctness of any return;
2) making a return where none has been made;
3) determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax;
4) determining the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of
any person in respect of any internal revenue tax; or
5) collecting any internal revenue tax liability.
I.R.C. § 7602.
' The concept of duality in IRS investigations was enunciated in Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). Because the Internal Revenue Code provides for both civil and
criminal penalties relating to tax liabilties, and because the information basic to a determi-
nation of either penalty is the same, the civil and criminal elements of an investigation are
"inherently intertwined." United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 309 (1978).
The Supreme Court interpreted the legislative history of § 7602 to support the statutory
premise that civil and criminal tax investigations are interrelated, and that Congress in-
tended for them to be conducted as such. Id. at 309-11. This duality of the scope of investi-
gation under § 7602 was previously emphasized in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 326
(1973).
An important development in the evolution of the duality concept is the irrelevance of
the primary purpose of the summons. The primary purpose is that aspect of the investiga-
tion, either civil or criminal, in which the IRS is most interested, and for which the IRS
issues the summons. See Note, Constraints on the Administrative Summons Power of the
Internal Revenue Service, 63 IowA L. REv. 526, 535 (1977). The blending of the civil and
criminal aspects of an IRS investigation accomplished by the duality concept has created
inconsistencies in the interpretations of the requirements of a § 7602 summons. See 437
U.S. at 305 n.6.
There are still, however, distinct consequences of civil and criminal tax violations. Sec-
tion 6663(b) imposes a civil penalty of 50% of the underpayment upon a taxpayer who
willfully has submitted a false or fraudulent tax return. LR.C. § 6653(b). Section 6659(a)
provides additionally that penalties provided by that chapter constitute a portion of the
taxpayer's liability. I.R.C. § 6659(a). See 437 U.S. at 308. Sections 7206 and 7207 provide for
the imposition of penalties of fines and imprisonment for tax fraud. I.R.C. §§ 7206-7207.
o See note 8 supra. The duality concept provides a premise for the conclusion that §
7602 summonses authorize joint criminal and civil investigations at preliminary stages. The
LaSalle Court recognized the validity of the duality concept, but reaffirmed the basic princi-
ple that a valid civil purpose must exist in order for a § 7602 summons to be enforceable.
While primacy of purpose is not determinative, a summons issued solely in aid of a criminal
investigation is invalid and unenforceable. 437 U.S. at 316 n.18 (1978).
10 See, e.g., United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 305 n.6 (1978) (various
courts of appeals adopted differing interpretations of the law concerning § 7602
summonses).
"t 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
22 The good faith element includes, but is not limited to, the components identified in
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). In Powell, the Court held that the investigation
1980]
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institutional commitment to recommendation for criminal prosecution."3
The LaSalle Court based its adoption of the subjective institutional com-
mitment standard on the premise that a summons could be issued in bad
faith prior to recommendation to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution if the IRS were committed to make a recommendation at the
time of the issuance. 4 The purpose of the subjective standard announced
in LaSalle is to protect the taxpayer from those few situations in which
the institutional commitment to recommendation for prosecution exists
and a section 7602 summons is used to obtain information for the Depart-
ment of Justice's criminal prosecution. 5 The effect of the LaSalle stan-
dard is to impose a heavy burden on the taxpayer to disprove the actual
must be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, the inquiry must be relevant to the
purpose, the information sought must not be already within the Commissioner's possession,
and the administrative steps required by the Code must be followed. Id. at 57-78; see 437
U.S. at 313-14. The LaSalle Court reiterated the Powell conclusion that harassment or coer-
cion to settle a collateral dispute would constitute bad faith. Id. at 314. The Supreme Court
in LaSalle did not limit the definition of good faith to that set out in Powell. Id. at 317 n.19.
13 The Supreme Court expanded the criteria for enforcement of a § 7602 summons in
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). In Donaldson, the Court held that a § 7602
summons must be issued prior to recommendation for criminal prosecution for tax fraud. Id.
at 536. The Court determined that recommendation occurs when the IRS refers the criminal
elements of its investigation under a § 7602 summons to the Department of Justice with a
recommendation for prosecution. Id. at 534-35; accord United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d
1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 1972).
LaSalle introduced the concept of institutional commitment to the criteria established
by Powell and Donaldson for enforcement of § 7602 summonses. The concept relates to
both the good faith standard of Powell and the recommendation of criminal prosecution
standard of Donaldson. See notes 12 & 13 supra.
After LaSalle, the relevant good faith inquiry is directed at the IRS, not the individual
agent conducting an investigation. 437 U.S. at 314. The conceptual difficulty with this stan-
dard is the forced application of a subjective standard to a bureaucratic unit. Saltzman,
Supreme Court's LaSalle Decision Makes it Harder to Successfully Challenge a Summons,
49 J. TAx. 130, 133 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Saltzman]. The practical difficulty with the
institutional element is the lack of "meaningful guidance" in LaSalle regarding the intended
definition or interpretation of the concept. Id.
The LaSalle Court acknowledged that institutional good faith would b; difficult to
question before recommendation for criminal prosecution. The Court posited, however, two
instances in which institutional bad faith could be proved. 437 U.S. at 316-17 n.19. The
Court recognized that delay of recommendation for evidence-gathering purposes and infor-
mation gathering for other departments are illustrative of the Donaldson recommendation
for criminal prosecution standard in the institutional commitment situation.
14 See 437 U.S. at 316. After the recommendation for criminal prosecution to the De-
partment of Justice, the issuance of a § 7602 summons clearly would be in bad faith under
an objective standard.
Although the LaSalle majority refused to accept such an objective standard, the dis-
senting members of the Court, in the 5-4 decision, supported the adoption of the objective
standard, indicating judicial support for such a standard. Id. at 319-21. See also United
States v. Marine Midland Bank, 585 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (appropriate test for enforce-
ment of § 7602 summons is whether summons was issued prior to recommendation for crim-
inal prosecution).
"5 See note 13 supra.
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existence of a valid civil tax liability investigation.16 The nature of this
burden results from the duality of IRS investigations.
1 7
In United States v. McGuirt and United States v. Maryland Lumber
Co. and Union Trust Co.,"" the Fourth Circuit addressed the practical
application of the LaSalle rule.1 9 In McGuirt, the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered whether a summons issued on the basis of information from an in-
formant regarding criminal tax liabilities was issued in bad faith. The
McGuirt court also considered whether a summons issued to obtain
records to which the IRS previously had ample access was tantamount to
harassment.2 In Union Trust, the Fourth Circuit addressed the suffi-
ciency of an agent's affidavit to show institutional good faith under the
LaSalle rule.
21
The Fourth Circuit in McGuirt held that the section 7602 summons
was enforceable. 22 In McGuirt, the IRS had received information from an
unnamed informant,5 apparently relating to the taxpayer's criminal tax
violations,24 prior to the assignment of an IRS agent to the taxpayer's
case. The agent contacted the taxpayer and, during the succeeding four
months, examined the taxpayer's records. The agent had access to study
and copy the taxpayer's records and documents for twenty to twenty-five
hours.25 At some time during the four month period, the IRS agent met
with the informant.26 The IRS agent referred his findings to the Intelli-
gence Division of the IRS, at which time a Special Agent was assigned to
conduct a criminal investigation.17 The Special Agent summoned bank
records and the taxpayer's records, but the taxpayer refused to comply.28
The IRS petitioned to enforce the summons in the United States Dis-
18 437 U.S. at 316.
17 See note 8 supra.
18 588 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 52. (1979).
1' The Fourth Circuit combined the appeals in McGuirt and Union Trust in order to
consider whether a § 7602 summons is enforceable if issued in aid of an IRS criminal inves-
tigation. The court delayed its decision until LaSalle was decided by the Supreme Court.
588 F.2d at 420.
:0 Id. at 421.
1 Id. at 420-21; see text accompanying notes 49-63 infra.
22 588 F.2d at 422.
23 In the district court trial, the court found the nondisclosure of the identity and testi-
mony of the informant fatal to a fair hearing of the case because the court considered those
factors essential to a determination of the purpose underlying the issuance of the summons.
United States v. McGuirt, 428 F. Supp. 95, 97 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
24 Brief for Appellees at 4, United States v. McGuirt, 588 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees].
25 Id. at 3. The agent had free access to the records during his visits and the taxpayer
and- his employees were fully cooperative with the agent's investigation. Id.
26 Id. The IRS agent's meeting with the informant was prior to at least two of the
agent's visits to the taxpayer's corporate office. The agent would not disclose at trial the
substance of his conversation with the informant at the advice of the agent's superiors and
government counsel. Id.
27 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
28 Brief for Appellees, supra note 24, at 3-4.
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trict Court for the Western District of North Carolina.2" At the hearing to
determine enforceability of the summons, the IRS did not reveal to the
court information provided by the informant, information provided to the
Special Agent by the preliminary agent, or the name of the informant.30
Further, the IRS did not allow the taxpayer's attorney to cross-examine
the agents regarding the information provided by the informant. 1 The
district court found that the Government's posture completely frustrated
the court's duty to determine the threshold issue of good faith, 2 and
therefore refused to enforce the summons.3 " The Government appealed
the case to the Fourth Circuit.3 ' The nature of the case was significantly
altered before the Fourth Circuit heard the appeal, however, when the
IRS abandoned its criminal fraud investigation. 5
The taxpayer in McGuirt relied on two distinct grounds in asserting
that the section 7602 summons was issued in bad faith.3 6 First, the tax-
payer argued that,. because the summons was issued on the basis of the
informant's information relating to criminal tax liabilities, the summons
was issued solely in aid of a criminal investigation, thereby constituting
bad faith.3 7 Second, the taxpayer asserted that the information sought by
the IRS was effectively in the IRS's possession because of the inordinate
amount of time during which the IRS agent had access to that particular
information, and therefore, enforcement of the summons would be tanta-
mount to harassment.3 8
29 Sections 7402 and 7604 of the Code vest the appropriate district court with jurisdic-
tion to enforce the provisions of the Code. I.R.C. §§ 7402, 7604.
30 See note 23 supra.
31 428 F. Supp. at 97.
' The district court in McGuirt relied on Donaldson and refused to be compelled to
make an ex parte decision on the issue of good faith based on an in camera inspection. Id.
The district court judge made this decision because the Government refused to allow cross-
examination and the court did not incorporate reports which the Government submitted to
the court. The reports, which the record showed to contain a copy of the agent's description
of the informant's report and a copy of the information which passed between the IRS agent
and Special Agent, were not retained by the judge and were not considered by him in his
review of the case. Id.
33 Id.
3, 588 F.2d at 419.
25 Id. at 421.
36 Id. Neither the taxpayer nor the Government made any arguments based on LaSalle
because the briefs were filed and the arguments were given before the Supreme Court de-
cided LaSalle. The Fourth Circuit delayed only its decision until after the LaSalle decision.
See note 19 supra.
27 If the § 7602 summons for McGuirt's records was, in fact, issued solely in aid of a
criminal investigation, it would be unenforceable under the Lasalle rule. See note 9 supra.
I Under the Powell rule, if the Commissioner possesses the information sought prior to
the issuance of the summons, the summons cannot be enforced because it was issued in bad
faith. 379 U.S. at 57-58. See note 12 supra. The taxpayer in McGuirt argued that the infor-
mation sought under the § 7602 summons of his documents was effectively in the Commis-
sioner's possession because the agent had access to the summoned material for 20 to 25
hours. See United States v. Pritchard, 438 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1971) (information consid-




The Fourth Circuit held that the taxpayer's contention that the sum-
mons was issued solely in aid of a criminal investigation was mooted by
the IRS's abandonment of its criminal fraud investigation prior to the
appeal. 9 The court further held that, while the taxpayer's contention
that the issuance of a summons subsequent to governmental access to the
summoned information led to an inference of inconvenience, such incon-
venience was not tantamount to harassment.40 The agent's investigatory
activities were not, therefore, indicative of institutional bad faith.41 The
Fourth Circuit therefore directed the district court to enforce the sum-
mons on remand.4
2
The Fourth Circuit's disposition of McGuirt reflects the lack of direc-
tion and definition which exists regarding the enforcement of section 7602
summonses after LaSalle.'5 Because the Fourth Circuit could not reach
the moot criminal purpose issue in McGuirt, the court was forced to de-
termine whether the facts before it justified a finding of bad faith under
LaSalle.44 The McGuirt court's finding that the inconvenience present in
McGuirt did not constitute institutional bad faith, however, does little to
elucidate LaSalle's vague bad faith standard.411 Presumably, there must
39 588 F.2d at 421; see text accompanying note 35 supra. The court's dismissal of the
appeal in McGuirt for mootness is consistent with the judicial policy against advisory opin-
ions in tax summons questions. S. Taylor, The Commissioner's Summons-Its Scope-Who
May Object in DEFENDING TAX FR&uD PRosEcuTroNs 24 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Taylor].
See also Birdsall v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
40 588 F.2d at 421-22.
41 The McGuirt court intimated that the taxpayer might have a cause of action under §
7605(b) of the Code, which limits second inspections. Id. at 422 n.1. The court failed to state
that in order to have such a cause of action, the taxpayer must have made an immediate
objection to the second examination. Where no such objection is made, the taxpayer is pre-
sumed to have consented to the examination and waived his right to attack its validity.
Taylor, supra note 39, at 23.
42 588 F.2d at 420.
4S See generally Saltzman, supra note 13, at 130-33.
44 Although the McGuirt court was unable to reach the criminal purpose issue because
of mootness, see text accompanying notes 35 & 39 supra, the court purported to reverse the
district court's judgment on the criminal purpose issue. The first sentence of the opinion,
which states that the issue presented to the Fourth Circuit was whether a summons issued
for a criminal fraud investigation is enforceable, indicates that the court intended to so
dispose of the case. See 588 F.2d at 420. Further, the juxtaposition of the court's order for
reversal and its invalidation of the district court's premise also indicates that intention. The
district court's premise which the Fourth Circuit invalidated stated that a summons could
not be issued in good faith if used for a criminal fraud investigation. Id.
The purpose of the Fourth Circuit's statement of intention regarding the disposition of
McGuirt may have been to indicate the court's inclination on a future substantive applica-
tion of LaSalle. If that was the court's intention, then the court indicated that the facts of
McGuirt would be insufficient to defeat a petition to enforce a § 7602 summons. Presuma-
bly, such a conclusion would be based on the petitioner's failure to disprove the existence of
a valid civil purpose investigation by the IRS, which LaSalle would require for a showing of
bad faith. See note 13 supra; text accompanying note 16 supra.
45 The Fourth Circuit exercised appropriate authority to categorize the IRS's investiga-
tory activity as manifesting institutional good or bad faith, since the LaSalle Court dis-
claimed any exclusivity of definition of good faith within the LaSalle opinion, see note 12
supra, tnd proposed a case-by-case factual analysis. 437 U.S. at 317 n.19, 318 n.20.
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be some point at which IRS investigative activity crosses McGuirt's unde-
fined line between inconvenience and harassment.46 The Fourth Circuit,
however, did not indicate where that point lies,'4 7 and thus imposed no
meaningful limitations on IRS investigations prior to the issuance of a
summons.
The Fourth Circuit's judicial deference to the power of the IRS is
manifested not only in McGuirt but also in the companion case, United
States v. Maryland Lumber Co. and Union Trust Co.48 In Union Trust,
the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a petition for enforce-
ment, with an affidavit asserting continuing good faith, is sufficient to es-
tablish a prima facie case for enforcement of a section 7602 summons
under the LaSalle rule.4 9 In Union Trust, the Government brought a
summons enforcement proceeding against the taxpayer, Maryland Lum-
ber Company. The taxpayer had refused to comply with the IRS sum-
mons, claiming that the summoned bank records had been stolen from its
accountant's office. 0° The judgment of the court was adverse to the tax-
payer, and the Fourth Circuit dismissed the taxpayer's appeal.5 1 In order
to obtain the previously summoned records, the IRS issued a summons to
the Union Trust Company for the taxpayer's records. The bank did not
comply,52 and the Government instituted a second enforcement proceed-
ing, on appeal before the Fourth Circuit with United States v. McGuirt
5
3
In the second enforcement proceeding, the IRS agent submitted an
affidavit in support of his petition for enforcement which stated that the
summons had been issued in good faith, and, that at the time of issuance,
no recommendation for criminal prosecution had been made to the De-
partment of Justice.5 ' The taxpayer, asserting that the summons was is-
sued solely in aid of a criminal investigation, requested discovery and an
evidentiary hearing. The district court denied the request and enforced
the summons.55
11 Harassment constitutes bad faith under LaSalle because LaSalle incorporated Pow-
ell standards, which categorized harassment as bad faith. 437 U.S. at 314.
"I Because the LaSalle Court proposed a case-by-case factual analysis of good faith
determinations, see note 45 supra, all of the pertinent facts of McGuirt, which include tim-
ing, degree of taxpayer cooperation, and opportunity to copy relevant documents, must be
considered as the basis for the court's analysis and determinktion.
48 588 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1978); see note 19 supra.
'9 588 F.2d at 421. The factual questions in Union Trust were resolved in the first
hearing of the case. Id.
60 599 F.2d at 420.
91 Id. at 422 (Widener, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Maryland Lumber Co.,
No. 77-1338 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 1978)).
52 Because the IRS petitioned Union Trust for the taxpayer's bank records, the tax-
payer was entitled to intervene under § 7609(b) of the Code to stay compliance with the
third party summons. I.R.C. § 7609(b).
11 See note 19 supra.
588 F.2d at 420-21.
" Id. at 421. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the
taxpayer's request for discovery in Union Trust because the court was bound by its deter-
mination of the factual situation in the first enforcement proceeding. Id. Judge Widener, in
9
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The Fourth Circuit in Union Trust determined that the agent's peti-
tion for enforcement and the supporting affidavit established a prima fa-
cie case for enforcement under LaSalle,56 and held the summons enforce-
able.5 7 The court reasoned that an evidentiary hearing and discovery were
not warranted because the taxpayer presented no new evidence or affida-
vits countering the agent's affidavit . 5 The court did not address the tax-
payer's defense that the summons was issued solely in aid of a criminal
prosecution, because that issue had been decided in the first enforcement
proceeding.
59
As in McGuirt, the Fourth Circuit in Union Trust was unable to ad-
dress the application of the LaSalle rule regarding the criminal investiga-
tion defense to the enforcement of a section 7602 summons.6 0 In address-
ing the procedural issue of burden of proof, however, the Union Trust
court announced a rule consistent with some decisions since LaSalle,
1
but inconsistent with the spirit of LaSalle. The LaSalle Court admitted
that the burden of proof it established for the taxpayer was heavy, but
the Court clearly did not intend for the burden to be impossible to
meet.62 The Fourth Circuit in Union Trust attempted to provide some
practical standards for the application of the LaSalle rule, but instead
created a virtually impossible burden of proof for the taxpayer. The
Union Trust court established two components of a prima facie case for
the IRS in a section 7602 summons enforcement proceeding, an investi-
his concurrence in the Fourth Circuit result, underscored that rationale, applying the princi-
ple of collateral estoppel to support his conclusion. Id. at 422 (Widener, J., concurring).
as The petition for enforcement filed by the IRS in Union Trust alleged compliance
with the Powell good faith requirements. See note 12 supra. The affidavit of the agent sup-
ported the conclusion. 588 F.2d at 420; see also Lipton, supra note 6, at 81, citing United
States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975) (agent's affidavit is sufficient to support his
statement of compliance with Powell). In light of LaSalle, however, the question of whether
the individual agent was competent to make such allegations for the institution should be
an important inquiry. Judge Widener addressed that question in Union Trust, stating 'that
the affidavit of the IRS agent was insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie showing of
the institutional commitment of the IRS because the affidavit gave no factual basis for the
conclusion of compliance with LaSalle. 588 F.2d at 422 (Widener, J., concurring).
17 588 F.2d at 420.
5 Id. at 421.
:9 Id.
10 See note 44 supra.
61 In United States v. O'Henry's Film Works, Inc., 598 F.2d 313, 320 (2d Cir. 1979), the
court held that discovery and evidentiary hearings should be allowed onl where the tax-
payer makes a "substantial preliminary showing" to support his burden of proof. In United
States v. Broadview Say. & Loan, [1979] Fp. TAx. Rip. (CCH) (79-2 U.S.T.C.) 9490 at
87,766, 87,769 (N.D. Ohio 1979), the court stated that only minimal discovery or evidentiary
hearing should be allowed, if at all, because Congress intended enforcement proceedings to
be summary in nature.
62 See 437 U.S. at 316. Although the Supreme Court in LaSalle established a heavy
burden of proof on the taxpayer to show bad faith in an enforcement proceeding because of
policy considerations, the Court specifically stated that the good faith inquiry in such pro-
ceedings cannot be abandoned. Id. There are countervailing policy considerations which
support the taxpayer's right to challenge a summons on bad faith grounds before the recom-
mendation for prosecution. See note 13 supra.
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gating agent's petition for enforcement and a supporting affidavit,"3 which
are relatively easy to produce. To rebut that prima facie evidence, how-
ever, a taxpayer would have to produce facts to which he has no access
because of court-sanctioned strict limitations on discovery." The result in
Union Trust is that the Fourth Circuit accords too much deference to the
IRS, giving the IRS too much power while depriving the taxpayer of any
effective defense in a summons enforcement proceeding.
The Supreme Court in LaSalle purported to resolve the confusion and
inconsistencies in the law relating to enforcement of section 7602 sum-
monsesY The decision in LaSalle provided no concrete standards, how-
ever, to guide lower federal courts in the implementation of the policy
enunciated in LaSalle."' As Union Trust illustrates,' 7 in the absence of
such standards taxpayers well may be stripped of their rights as courts
defer to the power of the IRS. If, as it appears, the judiciary is unable to
deal effectively with the interpretation of section 7602, perhaps congres-
sional action to define the rights and responsibilities of the IRS and the
taxpayer under section 7602 is the answer to the dilemma of the lower
federal courts.
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See note 56 supra.
"See note 61 supra and text accompanying note 55 supra.
65 See note 13 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
47 See text accompanying notes 48-64 supra.
